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 A B S T R A C T  
This study aims to explain the negative entrenchment effect arisen from selling and 
purchasing related party transactions on business group conglomerates. This study 
used 322 firm-year data of firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2013 
period. This research provides evidence that the ownership by business conglome-
rates strengthened the negative entrenchment effect in both total of selling-
purchasing related party transactions and selling-purchasing related party transac-
tions which come from operating activities. Thus, from the result, it can be pre-
sumed that there might be a possibility of agency conflict arisen from selling-
purchasing related party transactions when a firm is part of business conglomerates.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan pengaruh kubu negatif (negative en-
trenchment) muncul dari penjualan dan pembelian transaksi dengan pihak terkait di 
konglomerat kelompok usaha. Penelitian ini menggunakan 322 perusahaan data-
tahun perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada periode 2012-2013. 
Penelitian membuktikan bahwa kepemilikan oleh konglomerat bisnis memperkuat 
efek kubu negatif pada baik total transaksi penjualan-pembelian pihak terkait mau-
pun transaksi jual-beli pihak terkait yang berasal dari aktivitas operasional. Dengan 
demikian, dari hasil tersebut, dapat diduga bahwa mungkin ada konflik keagenan 
yang terjadi dari transaksi dengan pihak yang menjual-beli ketika suatu perusahaan 
merupakan bagian dari konglomerat bisnis.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of a firm's financial reports is to 
provide useful information for stakeholders, both 
internal and external parties, in the economic deci-
sion-making process (IAS 1 Revised 2009). There-
fore, the financial statements must meet the three 
main requirements such as being relevant, reliable, 
and comparable (Wild 2013). However, agency 
conflict could affect the quality of the financial 
statements. At the beginning of establishment of a 
firm, owners are also the executors of the operating 
activities. Along with growth of the firm, owners 
can no longer carry out operational activities due to 
the resource constraints. To overcome this problem, 
the owners finally give authority to the manager 
who has human capital. This is called agency 
theory, a contract of delegating the owner’s tasks 
and authority to the manager as an agent in the 
operational decision-making process (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
Agency conflict is not limited to information 
asymmetry between the owner and the manage-
ment. In developing countries, most of the firms are 
generally owned by families or business groups. 
This structural difference is caused by weak law-
enforcement in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 
1999; Peng, Wei, and Yang 2011). In countries with 
high law-enforcement, control rights or voting 
rights of small investors can still be protected 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1999). On 
the other hand, the majority of small investors in 
developing countries have virtually no control 
rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). As a result, small 
investors in developing countries will tend to form 
groups or concentrated in few major shareholders 
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to overcome the problem of the lack of control 
rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). A concentrated 
ownership under a group which later evolved into 
pyramid ownership structure and cross-
shareholding (Claessens et al. 2000) causing the 
controlling shareholder can set the course of the 
decision-making process or even any transaction 
activities within its subsidiaries even though the 
ownership is indirect (Bertrand et al. 2002). It is 
later known that the agency conflict in a concen-
trated ownership is mainly caused by differences 
between the interests of the controlling sharehold-
ers and the non-controlling shareholders (Villalon-
ga and Amit 2006). 
In firms with a concentrated ownership struc-
ture, Claessens et al. (2002) found that there is a 
wedge between the firm's cash-flow rights and 
control rights. Difference in a firm’s cash-flow 
rights and the control rights could trigger negative 
entrenchment effect through the act of expropriat-
ing rights of non-controlling shareholders by con-
trolling shareholders (Morck et al. 1988). The pos-
sibility of expropriation is getting the higher as the 
rights of the cash-flow is lower than the right of 
control (Johnson et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002; 
Joh 2003; Baek et al. 2004; Kang et al. 2014). 
The difference between cash-flow rights and 
control rights also provides incentives for man-
agement to carry out tunneling, which is a process 
of transferring assets from a firm which has a less 
cash-flow to another subsidiaries or affiliates that 
have greater cash-flow rights (Bertrand et al. 2002; 
Cheung et al. 2006; Munir et al. 2013). There are 
several ways for firms to do the tunneling, it could 
be selling or purchasing the output beyond the 
market price, assets leasing, as well as the provision 
of collateral for the loan made by its subsidiaries 
(Bertrand et al. 2002). Tunneling would be easier if 
it is done between firms within the group. This is 
then referred as related party transactions. 
This study focuses on the firms owned by busi-
ness conglomerates in Indonesia where transactions 
related with sales and purchases are frequently done 
due to diversification in their business unit. If the 
nature of the related party transactions matches with 
the efficient transaction theory, then the firm will be 
able to increase the shareholder value because of the 
reduction in transaction costs (Stein 1997; Shin and 
Park 1999; Kang et al. 2014). 
This research is derived from Kang et al. (2014) 
which is conducted in Republic of Korea where 
most of the firms are held by quite a few of con-
glomerates notably known as chaebol. The similar 
form also takes place in Indonesia since the majori-
ty of Indonesian firms is also controlled by several 
families and is owned by business conglomerates. 
Hence, this study is important as it would see 
whether the related party transactions carried out 
between firms in an Indonesian business group 
conglomerates are classified as an efficient transac-
tion or tend to have an opportunistic nature. 
This study investigates and provides empirical 
evidence on the effect of the difference in control 
rights and cash-flow rights toward related party 
transactions and the effect of the business conglo-
meration in the direction of differences in control 
rights and cash-flow rights on related party trans-
actions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Negative Entrenchment Effect 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency theory as 
a contract between the owner (principal) and the 
manager (agent) whose job is to manage the re-
sources owned by the owner, operate the business 
activities, and take strategic decisions as the firm's 
development efforts. The contract of delegating 
these tasks occurs due to limited resources owned 
by the owner. It is because along with the growth of 
the firm, the owners increasingly difficult to control 
the entire operating activities and, as a solution, the 
owners choose to hire others who have the re-
sources (human capital) as the manager to run the 
firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
However, the transfer of authority has led to 
information asymmetry. This is due to the owners 
rarely directly involved in operational activities 
and assumed the manager will take operational 
and strategic decisions, which are expected to im-
prove the performance of the firm and in line with 
the objectives of the owner. On the other hand, both 
the owner and manager, is a man who always think 
rationally so that each party would seek to maxim-
ize personal gain (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The 
incomplete contracts and the professional expertise 
possessed by agent (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) 
makes the manager has the opportunity to mistreat 
the authority owned. As a result, the owner must 
disburse some of their funds to supervise the man-
ager so that decisions taken by manager are aligned 
with the objectives of the owner 
The weakness of the agency theory proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling is, the research was carried 
out in the country with a dispersed ownership 
structure, which is considered not representative to 
explain conflicts that arise in other countries. Shlei-
fer and Vishny (1997) argue that corporate gover-
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nance and protection of shareholders are two im-
portant factors, which affect the agency conflict. 
In countries with a decent governance and 
high legal protection, dispersed ownership is not a 
problem because the control rights of the owners 
can still be offset by good governance mechanisms 
and enforcement (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This 
condition is different from the majority of countries 
in the world that still have a low-level governance 
practice and weak legal protection such as in Asia 
and Latin America (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La 
Porta et al. 1999; Peng, Wei, and Yang 2011). In 
those countries, dispersed ownership becomes a 
new problem for investors with a small portion of 
share ownership who are not well informed and 
their control rights has become meaningless to con-
duct any surveillance activities over the manager 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
As the ownership structure is concentrated, the 
extent of control over a firm is shown by the control 
rights held by the controlling shareholder (Fan and 
Wong 1992; Clasessens et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 
1999; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2005). A con-
centrated ownership under a group, which later 
evolved into pyramid structures and cross-
shareholding, (Claessens et al. 2000) causing the 
controlling shareholder could set the course of the 
decision-making process or transactions with sub-
sidiaries or affiliates even though the ownership is 
indirect (Bertrand et al. 2002). Thus, in countries 
with concentrated ownership, the agency conflict is 
no longer between the owner and the manager; but 
between the controlling shareholders with non-
controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
La Porta et al. 1999). 
The control rights are important since the con-
trolling shareholders can direct both of the strategic 
and operational decisions in accordance with their 
own goals; electing the managing director and 
finance director (Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 
2005), for instance. With the ability to put people in 
those positions, the controlling shareholder can 
now easily direct the operational activities so that 
all of the strategic policies taken will benefit their 
party. 
The magnitude of an authority so that the con-
trolling shareholder is able to direct the course of 
the firm's activities is called entrenchment effect 
(Claessens et al. 2002). The entrenchment effect can 
be positive if the control rights of the controlling 
shareholders are used to monitor the performance 
of management. However, the entrenchment effect 
can be negative if the controlling shareholders use 
it for the opportunistic purpose such as pointing 
family members in strategic positions to facilitate 
the approval process for any decision that actually 
requires the approval of non-controlling sharehold-
ers through the General Meeting of Shareholders 
(Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2005). 
A significant difference between the cash-flow 
right and the control rights can lead to negative 
entrenchment effect through the act of expropriat-
ing non-controlling shareholders’ rights by the con-
trolling shareholders (Morck et al. 1988; Johnson et 
al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002; Joh 2003; Baek et al. 
2004; Kang et al. 2014). Therefore, once the control 
rights are higher than the cash-flow rights, then the 
firm has been run by the controlling shareholders, 
not the managers (La Porta et al. 1999). An exces-
sive degree of control rights in the pyramid struc-
ture gives impact on the various aspects. It is found 
that a high magnitude in the control rights of the 
controlling shareholder will reduce the level of in-
formation in financial reports (Fan and Wong 2002; 
Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2005), reduce ac-
countability (Grossman and Hart 1988 in Francis, 
Schipper, and Vincent 2005), and provide incen-
tives for management to carry out tunneling (Mork, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2005). 
 
Related Party Transactions 
The activity of shifting resources between firms in 
the same group is known as a related party transac-
tion (Riyanto and Toolsema 2008). In Indonesia, the 
definition of related party transactions is referred to 
PSAK 7 (Revised 2010): Related Party Disclosures 
adopted from IAS 24: Related Party Disclosures. 
Based on PSAK 7 (Revised 2010) paragraph 9, re-
lated party transaction is defined as a transfer of 
resources, services or obligations between reporting 
entities with related parties, regardless of whether a 
price is charged. 
Related transactions are frequently be carried 
out by firms in the world, particularly if a group 
has a diversified business (OECD 2009; Kang et al. 
2014). With the existence of related party transac-
tions, the operations will be more efficient because 
it can reduce the transaction costs (Chang and 
Hong 2000). Related party transactions which are 
efficient and meet the economic needs of the firm is 
known as efficient transaction hypothesis (Chang 
and Hong 2000; Khanna and Palepu 2000). This 
theory turn into the basis that the transaction 
would provide benefits related for the firm. 
Chien and Hsu (2010) found out that there is a 
positive correlation between firm earnings and sell-
ing activities with related parties. Moreover, the 
negative impact arising from industry earnings 
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shock can be reduced with sales transactions with 
related parties (Chien and Hsu 2010). In Indonesia, 
a related party transaction associated with liability 
is proven to increase the value of the firm (Utama 
and Utama 2013 in Al Aggugi 2014). The positive 
effect of related party transactions in Indonesia to 
the value of the firm is also confirmed by Singeten-
ta (2012). 
However, there is an inconsistency in the effi-
cient transaction hypothesis. Related party transac-
tions that are commonly found in Asia could poten-
tially be used as one of to ways to expropriate the 
rights of non-controlling shareholders (Johnson et 
al. 2000). Related parties transactions are closely 
related to business diversification (OECD 2009; Kali 
and Sarkar 2011; Kang et al. 2014) and pyramid-
ownership structure (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
Morck et al. 2005; Riyanto and Toolsema 2008; 
Peng, Wei, and Yang 2011; Kang et al. 2014). Hence, 
related party transactions are often challenged 
through legal channels (Riyanto and Toolsema 
2008) as the pyramid-ownership structure is rarely 
found in countries with good governance and high 
shareholder protection. Therefore, come out the 
second theory which states more related transac-
tions are abusive (Chen, Wang, and Li 2012) be-
cause of the high chance of expropriation of the 
non-controlling shareholders’ rights (Morck et al. 
2005; Djankov et al. 2008; Peng, Wei , and Yang 
2011), which known as conflict of interest hypothe-
sis (Chien and Hsu 2010; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 
2010). 
 
Hypotheses Development 
Various studies have confirmed the effect of the neg-
ative entrenchment effect on related party transac-
tions (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2005; Riyanto 
and Toolsema 2008; Chen, Wang, and Li 2012). The 
abusive related party transactions which lead to the 
expropriation rights of the non-controlling share-
holders are commonly found in a firm where there is 
a high control-ownership wedge, which is a proxy of 
negative entrenchment effect (Peng, Wei, and Yang 
2011). Therefore, it can be concluded that related 
party transactions in a firm which has a pyramid-
ownership structure indicated with control rights in 
excess of its cash-flows rights have a tendency to be 
abusive and in line with the conflict of interest hypo-
thesis (Fan and Wong 2002; Morck, Wolfenzon, and 
Yeung 2005; Peng, Wei, and Yang 2011). Thus the 
first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Negative entrenchment effect gives 
positive effect on related party transactions. 
Through the pyramid ownership structure, 
business conglomerates have an incentive to diver-
sify its business (OECD 2009). Through the busi-
ness diversification, those groups can do a lot of 
related party transactions (Kim and Yi 2006; Riyan-
to and Toolsema 2008; Kali and Sarkar 2011). A 
firm is considered will get benefits from diversified 
business units as it can overcome limitations arising 
from capital markets, product markets, as well as 
the labor market (Khanna and Palepu 2000 in Lins 
and Servaes 2002). In addition, with business diver-
sification, a firm can also reduce transaction costs 
(Stein. 1997; Shin and Park 1999; Kang et al. 2014). 
However, both horizontal and vertical business 
diversification have not given any evidence that it 
can increase the value of the members of conglome-
rate groups (Kim and Yi 2006). Hence, there is a 
presumption that related party transactions are 
aimed to tunnel a firm’s assets (Kang et al. 2014); 
not for the purpose of efficiency which can increase 
the value of the firm. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that a firm owned by conglomerate groups has a 
high proximity to negative entrenchment effect as a 
result of the pyramid ownership structure that en-
courages diversification and lead to higher volume 
of related party transactions. Thus the second hy-
pothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1a: Ownership by conglomerate groups 
strengthens the effect of negative entrenchment 
effect of related party transactions. 
A conglomerate group can diversify its busi-
ness either related or unrelated with the main activ-
ity of the parent firm (Kang et al. 2014). Assuming 
the diversification aims to reduce transaction costs 
(Stein 1997; Shin and Park 1999), most of the related 
party transactions occurred are linked with opera-
tional activities of its main business. However, this 
assumption is not entirely acceptable since various 
studies suggest diversification does not increase the 
value of the firm (Lins and Servaes 1999; Kali and 
Sarkar 2011). Thus, there is a possibility that a 
member firm of conglomerate groups use operating 
related-party transaction to tunnel its assets. This 
can occur because the operating related-party 
transactions are subtle and take place throughout 
the accounting period (Kang et al. 2014). Hence, the 
next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1b: Ownership by conglomerate groups 
strengthens the negative entrenchment effect of the 
operating related-party transactions. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Population and Sample 
Using purposive sampling method, the total sam-
ple of 322 firm-years is as shown in Table 1. 
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Research Model 
Model 1: Is used to test hypothesis 1 which is the 
effect of negative entrenchment effect on the total 
value of selling and purchasing related party trans-
actions. 
𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽5𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑖 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  . (1) 
Model 2: Is used to test hypotheses 2a and 2b: 
the effect of an ownership by conglomerate group 
on the entrenchment negative entrenchment effect 
and the value of operating related-party transac-
tions. 
𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑃𝑇_𝑂𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐶 𝑥 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑖 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . (2) 
Description of variables: 
RPT Total value of related party transactions (sell-
ing and purchasing RPT)/market value of equity; 
RPT_O Total value of selling and purchasing oper-
ating RPT/market value of equity; 
DVC Control-ownership wedge ratio of the control-
ling shareholder (1+control rights)/(1+cash-flow 
rights); 
GROUP 1 if a firm is owned by conglomerate 
groups, 0 if not; 
SIZE Natural logarithm of net sales (in million Ru-
piah); 
LEV Total debt/total equity; 
ROA Net income/total asset; 
AVOID 1 if 0 < ROA < 2%, and 0 if not; 
MB Market value of equity/book value of equity; 
CGI Corporate Governance Index (proxied by the 
role of board of commissioner and audit commit-
tee); 
Year Year indicator. 
 
Operational Variable  
Dependent Variable: 
The calculation of related party transactions to test 
hypotheses 1 and 1a using the done in the follow-
ing formula: 
RPTi =
Total Value of RPTi
Market Value of Equity
i
 . (3) 
Description: 
RPT = related party transactions 
Total Value of RPT includes operating and non-
operating RPT. 
Operating related-party transactions is used to 
test hypotheses 1b which is obtained from the fol-
lowing formula: 
 
𝑅𝑃𝑇_𝑂𝑖 =
Operating  RPT  i
Market  Value  of  Equity i
 . (4) 
Description: 
Operating RPT is selling and purchasing of operat-
ing RPT. 
 
Measurement of the Negative Entrenchment Ef-
fect 
Using the ratio of control-ownership wedge (DVC) 
as a proxy of negative entrenchment effect, DVC is 
calculated from the difference between the control 
rights and cash-flow rights owned by the control-
ling shareholder. The control rights are calculated 
by looking at the smallest control rights (weakest 
link) owned by any individual shareholders in each 
chain of ownership structure. Individual share-
holders are then traced his identity to determine 
whether there is a family relationship with the oth-
er shareholders. This search will lead to informa-
tion about certain family who is the ultimate owner 
of a group. If there is a family relationship with the 
other shareholders, the control rights of the mem-
bers will be added collectively and compared back 
to the weakest link the chain of ownership struc-
ture. While the cash-flow rights are calculated by 
multiplying the cash-flow rights of the controlling 
shareholder in the ownership structure along the 
chain of ownership. 
𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 (𝐷𝑉𝐶)𝑖 =  1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡𝑠𝑖 ÷ (1 +
 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡𝑠𝑖). (5) 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Population: Firms listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange as of 2013 484 
-/- Firms listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange after 2012 (31) 
-/- Financial institutions (79) 
-/- Firms with negative equity (8) 
-/- Firms with incomplete annual report (18) 
-/- Firms with reporting currency other than Indonesian Rupiah (64) 
-/- Firms which do not disclose selling-purchasing related party transactions (112) 
-/- Firms without a complete ownership structure (11) 
Total of firm  161 
Number of observation x2 
Final Sample 322 
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4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 322 observations, as in Table 2, it can be seen 
that the variables of related party transactions 
(RPT) and operating related party transactions 
(RPT_O) have a high deviation standard. This is 
due to the nature of the transaction which is differ-
ent for each company in the current year. The mean 
value of related party transactions (RPT) is 40% of 
the market value with a minimum value of 0, which 
means there are no transactions in 2012 (3 firms) or 
2013 (7 firms). The highest value of 1410.9% in RPT 
is derived from related party transactions underta-
ken by PT Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia (CEKA). 
On average, the operating related party trans-
actions in Indonesian firms are amounting 30.4% of 
the market value. The highest selling and purchas-
ing activities with related parties are found in 2013 
which is done by PT Eterindo Wahanatama with 
the value of 365% of its market value. 
The DVC variable shows the control-
ownership wedge in the form of a ratio. The mean 
of the wedge is 5.1% with a minimum value of 1, 
which means a firm is fully owned by a family, 
government, or other institutions; therefore, there is 
no separation of control rights and cash-flow rights. 
The highest wedge ratio is 34.3%, which may lead 
to evidence that the ownership structure in Indone-
sia is still in a form of pyramid structure which is 
characterized by the separation of control rights 
and cash-flow rights (Claessens 2000). 
However, there are limitations for the variable 
DVC. Of the 322 observations, 185 observations or 
57.45% of the sample has a wedge of 0. This is due 
to some firms are owned by foreign firms so that 
the ownership structure cannot be searched further. 
Only two foreign firms in which its ownership can 
be traced; i.e. CAB Holding, which is controlled by 
Salim Group and Asia Pacific Holdings Limited 
owned by Lippo Group. Another finding is, the 
Indonesian controlling shareholders in conglome-
rate groups are generally became the second-largest 
shareholder after the foreign controlling sharehold-
er (MNCN, KPIG in 2012) or the government (JRPT, 
PJAA). It certainly causes bias in the calculation of 
the control-ownership wedge and the status of the 
company as part of business group conglomerates. 
The firm size (SIZE) also varies with average 
sales of Rp 7 trillion. Using net sales as a proxy, 
Astra through ASII topped the observations with 
net sales in 2013 amounting up to Rp 194 trillion, 
followed by TLKM and HMSP. 
The funding of Indonesian firms is in majority 
still obtained from loans with average in the leve-
rage of 28%. The high level of debt may increase 
agency conflict as there are opportunities for control-
ling shareholders to manipulate earnings through 
related party transactions (Kang et al. 2014). 
The return on net sales to assets is shown 
through ROA in which the average ROA of Indone-
sian firms has a rate of return of 10.4%. However, 
the deviation standard of the ROA is quite high. In 
2012 and 2013, 20 firms had a net loss which affects 
the ROA that is worth minus. 
In line with the ROA, firms with poor perfor-
mance tend to do an opportunistic earnings man-
agement (Kang et al. 2014). In 2012 and 2013, 49 
firms have the opportunities to conduct earnings 
management when 0 < ROA < 2% as indicated by 
the variable AVOID. The mean of AVOID is quite 
low at 0.152, which means the majority of firms in 
Indonesia still have a good performance. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Entire Observations 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RPT 0.401 1.100 0.000 14.109 
RPT_O 0.304 0.600 0.000 3.650 
DVC 1.051 0.088 1.000 1.343 
SIZE       7,422,882      18,800,000               9,023     194,000,000  
LEV  28.669 22.863 0.000 101.910 
ROA 0.104 0.154 -0.610 0.850 
AVOID 0.152 0.360 0.000 1.000 
MB 2.946 3.333 -15.470 19.730 
CGI 58.025 8.047 22.000 80,000 
Table Description 
RPT = Total value of related party transactions (selling and purchasing RPT)/market value of equity. RPT_O = Total value of 
operating selling and purchasing RPT/market value of equity. DVC = ControL-ownership wedge ratio of the controlling shareholder 
(1+control rights)/(1+cash flow rights). SIZE = Natural logarithm of net sales (in million Rupiah). LEV = Total debt/total equity. ROA 
= Net income/total asset. AVOID = 1 if 0 < ROA < 2%, and 0 if not. MB = Market value of equity/book value of equity. CGI = 
Corporate governance index (proxied by the role of Board of Commissioner and audit committee).  
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The market-to-book value ratio (MB) in Indo-
nesian firms is still relatively small; it is 2.946% in 
average. The highest book value is held by HMSP 
in 2012 (19.73%) while the lowest is ARGO (-
15.47%). Firms with either high or low market-to-
book-value have the same opportunities to do ex-
propriation activities through related party transac-
tions (Kang et al. 2014). 
Using a total of 84 questions in checklist of 
Hermawan (2009), the average Indonesian firms 
scored 58.02 (69.07%) or 2 points above the mini-
mum value for the index of corporate governance. 
The result above indicates that corporate gover-
nance practice related with the role of Board of 
Commissioner and audit committee is quite good 
but still needs much improvement. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Group and Non-
Conglomerate Group 
The total sample of 322 observations is divided into 
two groups: firms that belong to the conglomerate 
group and non-conglomerate group. After the iden-
tification of the owner, it is found out that 150 ob-
servations (46.58%) are owned by the conglomerate 
group while 172 (53%) observations are a non-
conglomerate group. The result shows the average 
of related party transactions (RPT) in non-
conglomerate group is higher than in the conglo-
merate group. 
The operating related party transactions 
(RPT_O) in the conglomerate group have a mean of 
26.4% of the market value. This number is lower 
compared to the related party transactions in non-
conglomerate group, which is in the range of 33% 
of the market value (see Table 3). This outcome 
shows related party transactions under a non-
conglomerate group has a higher market value on 
its equity. It can be interpreted that more investors 
consider related party transactions done by a non-
conglomerate firm is more likely to be efficient and 
investors are responding positively for such trans-
actions. 
The control-ownership wedge (DVC) of the 
conglomerate group is higher than the non-
conglomerate group. These results are in line with 
Claessens et al. (2000) which states countries in 
Asia are generally concentrated in its ownership 
structure which is characterized by a high separa-
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Group and Non-Conglomerate Group 
Variable 
Group (n = 150) Non-Group (n = 172) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
RPT 0.331 0.789 0.463 1.313 
RPT_O 0.264 0.572 0.338 0.624 
DVC 1.101 0.105 1.007 0.030 
SIZE  8,955,020   24,000,000   6,086,715   12,500,000  
LEV  30.717 22.47 26.883 23.118 
ROA 0.091 0.131 0.114 0.171 
AVOID 0.133 0.341 0.169 0.375 
MB 2.558 2.786 3.285 3.722 
CGI 57.687 6.985 58.320 8.880 
 
Table 4 
The Test Result of Hypothesis 1 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Probability Note 
Intercept +/- 1,461 0.000 
 
DVC + -0.875 0.000 *** 
SIZE + -0.017 0.108 
 
LEV + -0.004 0.000 *** 
ROA - 0.251 0.062 * 
AVOID + -0.104 0.082 * 
MB +/- -0.032 0.000 *** 
CGI - -0.001 0.312 
 
Year +/- -0.004 0.461 
 
R-Squared 0.162     
 
Prob > F 0.000 
   
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. 
Dayinta Ayuningtyas: Negative entrenchment … 
422 
tion in the control rights and cash-flow rights. In a 
conglomerate group, the average ratio is 10% while 
the average non-conglomerate group has a ratio of 
0.70%. 
The funding sources of the firms owned by 
conglomerate groups are also mostly from loan 
with an average on the leverage of 30%. The ROA 
mean of the conglomerate group is 9%; it is lower 
than non-conglomerate group in which leverage is 
11%. Firms affiliated with conglomerate groups are 
considered to have a higher chance of expropria-
tion by the capital market. This can be seen in the 
average of market-to-book-value (MB) of 2.55. This 
value is lower than the average in a non-
conglomerate group in which MB has a value of 
3.28. The results above prove that capital market 
has done a discount to brace a chance of expropria-
tion. 
Looking at AVOID, non-conglomerate group 
has a higher likelihood to do expropriation activi-
ties with a mean value of 0.16. The corporate go-
vernance index for conglomerate group is lower 
than the non-group with a value of 57, 68. Howev-
er, this difference is not significant where the non-
conglomerate group has a mean value of 58.32. 
 
Negative Entrenchment Effect on Selling and Pur-
chasing Related Party Transactions 
The negative effect is found among the negative 
entrenchment effect on related party transactions 
(Table 4) so that hypothesis 1 is rejected. From the 
result, it can be concluded that the act of expropria-
tion over rights of the non-controlling shareholders 
is not made through selling and purchasing related 
party transactions. This result differs from Kang et 
al. (2014) who found a positive effect between nega-
Table 5 
Test Results of Hypothesis 1a 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Probability Note 
Intercept +/- 1.733 0.000 
 DVC + -1.155 0.000 *** 
GROUP + 0.021 0.319 
 DVCXGROUP + 0.629 0.066 * 
SIZE + -0.016 0.120 
 LEV + 0.004 0.000 *** 
ROA - 0.245 0.067 * 
AVOID + -0.101 0.089 * 
MB +/- -0.032 0.000 *** 
CGI - -0.002 0.312 
 Year +/- -0.003 0.467 
 R-Squared 0.163     
 Prob > F 0.000     
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 6 
Test Result of Hypothesis 1b 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Probability Note 
Intercept +/- 1.714 0.000 
 DVC + -1.149 0.000 *** 
GROUP + 0.020 0.324 
 DVCXGROUP + 0.630 0.064 * 
SIZE + 0.016 0.125 
 LEV + 0.004 0.000 *** 
ROA - 0.244 0.069 * 
AVOID + -0.104 0.084 * 
MB +/- -0.031 0.000 *** 
CGI - -0.002 0.028 
 Year +/- -0.003 0.470 
 R-Squared 0.162     
 Prob > F 0.000     
 ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. 
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Vol. 19, No. 3, Decmber 2016 – March 2017, pages 415 – 426 
423 
tive entrenchment effect and selling-purchasing 
related party transactions. 
There are two possible causes of the differences 
in the direction of this variable. First, the quality of 
disclosure of related party transactions in Indonesia 
is still low so that the value of selling and purchasing 
related party transactions in the financial statements 
has not revealed the actual transactions occurred. 
Secondly, the ultimate owner of some firms cannot 
be traced since they are owned by foreign firms, 
which act as the controlling shareholder; hence, the 
ownership structure is considered as direct owner-
ship. Third, other than owned by foreign firms, some 
firms are directly owned by a family as found in 
Maspion Group. It has a distinct pyramid structure; 
yet, all of the shareholders in the structure are the 
family members so that the control and the cash-
flow rights acquired remains 100%. 
 
Negative Entrenchment Effect of the Conglome-
rate Group on Selling and Purchasing Related 
Party Transactions 
A positive effect is found among the negative en-
trenchment effect of the conglomerate group on 
related party transactions. The coefficient of 
DVCXGROUP is worth 0.629 with 0.066 of signific-
ance (Table 5). From this result, it can be concluded 
that there is opportunity for the conglomerate 
group to expropriate the non-controlling share-
holders’ rights through selling and purchasing re-
lated party transactions Therefore, the hypothesis 
1a is accepted. This result is consistent and sup-
ports the conflict of interest hypothesis for related 
party transactions. 
Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) reported the neg-
ative entrenchment effect provides incentives for 
controlling shareholders to engage in self-dealing 
activities by exploiting voting rights of the non-
controlling shareholders. Related party transactions 
in the company with pyramid-ownership structure 
generally have two objectives; between tunneling 
or propping (Riyanto and Toolsema 2008; Peng, 
Wei, and Yang 2010). Tunneling is the activity of 
transferring resources from subsidiaries to parent 
company in the pyramid-ownership structure 
(Riyanto and Toolsema 2008) with a purpose to put 
the cash-flow rights back to the controlling share-
holders (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2000). 
In contrast, propping is the transfer of resources 
from parent company to subsidiary that aims to 
prevent any financial insolvency in its subsidiary 
(Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton 2003). Thus, prop-
ping is commonly done when a subsidiary is hav-
ing financial difficulty (Ying and Wang 2013). 
Related party transactions that aim to tunnel 
the assets are clearly a form of expropriation over 
the rights of minority shareholders in a subsidiary 
(Riyanto and Toolsema 2008) so that it can be un-
derstood if related party transactions occurred in a 
firm with pyramid-ownership structure will be 
responded negatively by the markets as found by 
Peng, Wei, and Yang (2011). Once a firm is in a 
good financial condition, the controlling sharehold-
er will tend to conduct related party transactions in 
the form of tunneling and, in return, market will 
give a negative response to the announcement of 
the transaction (Peng, Wei, and Yang 2011). 
Although there are different opinions on the 
purpose of related party transactions, there are two 
conclusions that can be drawn: first, related party 
transactions in the form of tunneling are clearly an 
expropriation over the rights of the non-controlling 
shareholders in subsidiaries. Secondly, firms with a 
pyramid-ownership structure, in which is generally 
owned by the conglomerate groups and characte-
rized by the separation of voting rights and cash-
flow rights, trigger the negative entrenchment ef-
fect through abusive related party transactions us-
ing either tunneling or propping mechanisms. 
 
Negative Entrenchment Effect of the Conglomerate 
Group on Operating Related Party Transactions 
Negative entrenchment effect through related party 
transactions on operating activities is found as a 
firm is a member of a conglomerate group as 
shown by DVCXGROUP variable in the Table 6, so 
that the hypothesis 1b is accepted. One reason for 
choosing the operating related party transaction as 
a way of asset tunneling is, operating related party 
transactions is relatively easy to do since the trans-
fer pricing activity, as well as the sale and purchase 
of production or raw materials, will take place 
throughout the accounting cycle because it relates 
to the operations of the company. 
If the value of a non-operating RPT is insignifi-
cant, it can be certain that the conglomerate group 
would choose non-operating transactions as a way 
of tunneling because of the high degree of subjec-
tivity (Kang et al. 2014). However, the non-
operating RPT is normally high in value and ma-
terial. It even could lead to potential conflict of in-
terest (Sari, Djajadikerta, and Baridwan 2013) so as 
to invite the attention of regulators as well as non-
controlling shareholders (Kang et al. 2014). 
 
Analysis of the Control Variables 
Other variables that give an effect on related party 
transactions are leverage, return on assets, AVOID, 
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and market-to-book-value. For the leverage (LEV), 
the increase of related party transactions is in line 
with the increase in the financial risk as most of the 
funds are obtained from debt. These results fit the 
initial prediction that firms with a high debt level 
tend to do an earning management through related 
party transactions. 
The positive coefficient on return on assets 
(ROA) indicates firms with a good financial per-
formance tend to have a high related party transac-
tion. This result is consistent with Kang et al. (2014) 
and provides evidence that every firm, with either 
good or bad financial performance, has the oppor-
tunity to manage it earnings through related party 
transactions. Conversely, when a firm’s ROA is 
below 2%, the related party transactions decreases 
as shown in the variable AVOID which has a nega-
tive direction. 
There are differences between the predictions 
in the direction of the coefficient for variable 
AVOID. Such differences may be because of this 
research took the sample in 2012 and 2013 period 
where some firms were still under pressure from 
the global economic crisis that hit Europe in 2010. 
The impact is, the export-based company has a low 
return on assets as they have transactions with ex-
ternal parties, especially when the customers resid-
ing abroad. It is strongly related with the AVOID 
variable. In this case, then, related party transac-
tions are in line with efficient transaction hypothe-
sis as found by Chien and Hsu (2010) stating that 
related party transactions can reduce the financial 
risk arising from the industry earnings shock. 
The variable of market-to-book-value (MB) 
proves a negative effect on both of total and operat-
ing related party transactions. This finding is in 
contrast to Skinner and Sloan (2002) where a firm 
with a high market-to-book-value tends to conduct 
abusive related party transactions to prevent a de-
cline in the stock price. The negative effect between 
market-to-book-value in this research is consistent 
with the findings of Kang et al. (2014) stating when 
a firm has a high chance to grow, then the gain 
from transactions with third parties are much high-
er. From this result it can be concluded that firm 
actually considers related party transactions cannot 
be classified as an efficient transaction. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
A concentrated ownership structure makes the 
agency conflict in Indonesia, taking place between 
the controlling shareholders and non-controlling 
shareholders. When the controlling shareholders 
have a significant control rights, they can direct the 
firms run the policies. This is called entrenchment 
effect. The entrenchment effect can be positive when 
the control rights can improve the oversight function 
over the management that can increase the compa-
ny’s value. On the other hand, there is a chance of 
expropriation activities if the control rights are high-
er than the cash-flow rights. In this case, the entren-
chment effect will turn its direction to be negative. 
This research looks at the effect of negative en-
trenchment on selling-purchasing related party 
transactions. The result is, negative entrenchment 
effect negatively affects selling and purchasing re-
lated party transactions so that it can be concluded 
that the expropriation of the rights of non-
controlling shareholders are not made through sell-
ing and purchasing related party transactions. 
However, this study proves that the ownership 
by conglomerate groups strengthens the negative 
entrenchment effect both on the total of related 
party transactions and operating related-party 
transactions. Once a firm is owned by a conglome-
rate groups, there is a possibility of tunneling 
through selling and purchasing related party trans-
actions as a result of the diversification efforts un-
dertaken by the group. This result supports pre-
vious studies which prove the related party trans-
actions in countries with a concentrated ownership 
under the control of conglomerate group tend to be 
abusive and potentially lead to the expropriation of 
rights of the non-controlling shareholders. 
The limitations and suggestions for further re-
search development are that the related party 
transactions on sales and purchases only use the 
information contained in the financial statements 
on Notes to the Financial Statements section and it 
does not take account of any transaction with con-
flict of interest in a publication issued by the Indo-
nesia Stock Exchange as conducted by Sari, Djaja-
dikerta, and Baridwan (2014). For further research, 
transactions with conflict of interest can be put in to 
the related party transaction formula as a compo-
nent of non-operating activities. 
Besides that , the limitation of this research in-
clude that the value of related party transactions is 
the total of related party transactions and does not 
separated into both selling and purchasing transac-
tions. Future studies can perform regression for 
each category of selling and purchasing related 
party transactions. This grouping helps to explain 
the variable AVOID and MB. Firms with a low re-
turn on assets and a high market-to-book ratio tend 
to do sales transactions with external parties com-
pared to purchases transaction since the sales will 
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provide higher incentive for the firm. 
In relation to the party transaction disclosure 
requirements, as enclosed in PSAK No. 7 (Revised 
2010) and Bapepam-LK No. VIII. G. 7 of 2000, the 
regulators can reduce the risk of expropriation the 
rights of non-controlling shareholders from the 
abusive related party transactions. However, in 
practice, the quality of disclosure of related party 
transactions in Indonesia is still low since not all of 
the points in the regulation are disclosed by the 
management. Therefore, it is necessary for the regu-
lators to ensure that all elements related with dis-
closure on related party transactions should be 
comprehensively described in the financial reports. 
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